Prof Chandradhar Sharma on Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy, Page 312 writes,
A momentary idea can be neither self-luminous nor can it ideate
itself. The reality of permanent self-luminous Self which is Pure
Consciousness must be admitted. Vedanta criticizes only their
momentary vijnanas and their view that external world is unreal
because it is a projection of momentary consciousness as this view
well smacks of subjectivism when consciousness is reduced to momentary
ideas. Vedanta points out that the arguments which the
Svatantra-Vijnänavädins advance against permanent consciousness are
more applicable to their own momentary consciousness. To take an
example, if bondage and liberation are impossible when conscious is
treated as permanent they are more so when consciousness is taken as
momentary. Vedänta accepts that Consciousness is Self-luminous and that
it ultimately transcends the subject-object duality and the trinity of
knowledge, knower and known and all the categories of the intellect.
But from the empirical standpoint, stresses Vedänta, it is far better
to describe Reality as Permanent and Pure Consciousness which is at
once Pure Existence and Pure Bliss, than to call it momentary for
whatever is momentary is miserable and self-contradictory. The
momentary vijnäna can be neither self-luminous nor can it ideate
itself. It requires the Pure Self which is Pure Consciousness to know
it. Vedänta may well rejoin: The view of the Svatantra-Vijnänavädins
is very much similar to Vedänta ; it contains very little error, its
only fault is that it declares consciousness to be momentary.
In page 253, he continues,
The antecedent link in the causal series, says Shankara, cannot even
be regarded as the efficient cause of the subsequent link because,
according to the theory of momentariness, the preceding link ceases to
exist when the subsequent link arises. If it is urged that the
antecedent moment when fully developed (parinispannâvasthah) becomes
the cause of the subsequent moment, it is untenable, because the
assertion that a fully developed moment has a causal efficiency
necessarily presupposes its connection with the second moment and this
repudiates the theory of universal momentariness. Again, if it is
urged (as is done by the Svatantra-Vijnänavädins) that the mere
existence of the preceding moment means its causal efficiency (bhâva
evâsya vyâpârah),this too is impossible, because no effect can arise
without imbibing the nature of the cause and to admit this is to admit
that the cause is permanent as it continues to exist in the effect and
thus to throw overboard the doctrine of momentariness.